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The motivation of professional personnel within the confines of formal management control systems is often 
problematic. The paper investigates how interactive management controls can augment a performance 
measurement framework (PMF) in order to motivate personnel in a state-controlled research organisation.  
A case study method, combined with a survey, was used to test the research questions. The results indicate 
that the PMF motivated its researchers, as well as facilitated the achievement of organisational objectives. 
The results also indicated the presence of a wide range of interactive management controls that were 
employed to design and implement the PMF. These interactive controls included leadership enthusiasm, 
ownership, open communication and other informal activities that acted as a lubricant to reduce the friction 
of the formal PMF. In effect, these informal controls motivated researchers because they provided a series 
of rewards, they improved the perception of formal controls and they increased the efficiency of the 
organisation structure. 
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The motivation of professionals in research 
organisations is often problematic within the 
confines of formal controls (Fitzgerald et al., 
1991). In this regard, professional personnel 
are (often) more creative when they work in a 
self regulated environment and formal controls 
are seen as a negative influence that reduces 
motivation (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2001; 
Marginson, 2002; Bisbe & Otley, 2004). From 
an organisational perspective, however, the 
motivation of professionals must be balanced 
with the attainment of strategic goals that are 
pursued within the confines of formal controls 
(Bisbe & Otley, 2004).  
Performance measurement is complex 
because it involves the simultaneous measure-
ment of human effort, the functioning of a 
system and the efficiency of organisational 
processes within these systems (Kerssens- 
van Drongelen, Nixon & Pearson, 2000). The 
development of a performance measurement 
framework (PMF) in the research and develop-
ment sector is especially problematic because 
of the non-repetitive nature of research 
projects (Saxberg & Slocum, 1968). Further-
more, these problems are compounded by the 
difficulty of isolating research returns, long 
time periods, multi-functional team members, 
the subjective nature of assessment and high 
levels of uncertainty (Kerssens-van Drongelen, 
1999; Jamsen, Suomola & Paranko, 2002; 
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Loch and Tapper, 2002; Baglieri, Chiesa, 
Grando & Manzini, 2001; Osama, 2006). 
Performance measurement in a State owned 
research organisations is further complicated 
because of the need to configure the interests 
of a diverse range of stakeholders, as well as 
motivate operations at a local level (Jamsen et 
al., 2002; Jordon & Malone, 2006).  
The paper investigates how a formal control 
system in a state controlled research organisa-
tion can be augmented with interactive 
management controls in order to motivate 
personnel. The first research question tests 
whether the performance measurement frame-
work (PMF) motivated its researchers, as well 
as facilitated the achievement of organisational 
objectives. The second research question 
investigates what interactive management 
controls were developed with respect to the 
design and implementation of the PMF. The 
third research question investigates how these 
interactive controls augment a PMF in order to 
motivate personnel. The unit of analysis is at an 
individual level and not at business unit level. 
This paper expands the argument of Bisbe 
and Otley (2004) that investigates the 
relationship between the presence of inter-
active management controls and motivated 
(innovative) behaviour. The importance of the 
study is also underlined, in a more local 
context, by the need to integrate research in 
South Africa with the growth of the national 
economy (Wray, 2004). An outline of the 
remainder of the study is as follows: Section 2 
develops a theoretical framework to explain 
how interactive controls can motivate 
professionals. Section 3 outlines the data and 
method. Section 4 introduces the case study. 
Section 5 presents and discusses the results. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and 
makes some suggestions for future research. 
2 
A theoretical framework 
A theoretical framework, illustrated in Figure 
1, proposes that a series of contingent variables 
influence the formal and informal management 
control systems in a performance measurement 
framework. According to Simons (1994), 
management control systems (MCS) are the 
formal, information-based routines and proce-
dures managers use to configure organisational 
activities and goals. Conversely, informal  
MCS involve interpersonal interaction patterns 
within subgroups in organisations in order to 
fortify mutual commitment toward common 
goals (Jaworski, 1988). In this regard, the 
theoretical framework proposes that both 
formal and informal controls incorporate 
rewards that increase the level of motivation in 















































The design of a PMF in the public research 
sector is contingent on its stakeholders,  
the technology environment, the company 
strategy, the organisation culture, size and 
structure and the prevailing information tech-
nology and management control systems 
(Pearson et al., 2000; Chiesa et al., 2007; Van 
Drongelen & Bilderbeek, 1999). In this regard, 
strategy has often been cited as the most 
important contingency variable (Ojanen & 
Vuola, 2006) because it directly influences the 
key actions, as well as the performance 
measures that are utilised to control the 
organisation (Merchant, 1998; Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2001).  
Interactive MCS 
The design and implementation of a formal 
control system like a PMF is subject to 
repeated interactions between management  
and subordinates. Simons (1994) defines 
interactive controls as systems used by 
management to interface with subordinates 
regarding the formulation and implementation 
of formal controls. In this respect, the 
mediation or interactive process can be 
labelled as a subset of informal systems that 
enhance the functioning of formal controls by 
reducing their friction (Otley, 1999; 2003; 
Anthony & Govindarajan, 2001; Marginson, 
2002; Kaplan & Norton, 2007).  Management 
are expected to trigger the interactive process 
by showing commitment and communicating 
their plans, feelings and ideas. This behaviour 
is often less formal and allows for a culture of 
communication outside the formal controls, as 
well as encourages individual participation, 
autonomy and ownership in the design and 
implementation of formal controls (Chiesa  
et al., 2007; Azzone, 2006; Kerssens-Van 
Drongelen et al., 2000; Emmanuel, Merchant 
& Otley, 1985; Krause & Liu, 1993; Moon & 
Fitzgerald, 1996; Kerssens-Van Drongelen, 
1999; Loch & Tapper, 2002).  
A theory of motivation 
The determinants of motivation are rooted in 
social psychology, neoclassical theory and 
management sociology (Sousa-Poza & Sousa-
Poza, 2000; Mulinge & Muller, 1998; Diaz-
Serrano & Viera, 2005; Levy-Garboua & 
Montmarquette, 2004; D’Addio, Eriksson & 
Frijters, 2007). Motivation, in this sense, is 
defined as goal-congruent behaviour by the 
employees (researchers) of an organisation 
(Robbins, 1993). The dynamics of motivation 
are described as an exchange process that 
involves the receipt of rewards for services 
rendered. From an employee perspective, 
services rendered require inputs like  
education, working hours, effort and the stress 
of physical conditions (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-
Poza, 2000). Organisations incur an agency 
cost to motivate goal-congruent behaviour 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Control systems, 
therefore, must incorporate a series of rewards 
to induce this behaviour (Merchant, 1998; 
Anthony & Govindarajan, 2001). These 
rewards can be extrinsic or intrinsic. Extrinsic 
rewards include benefits received from the 
formal conditions of employment including 
remuneration, fringe benefits,  job security and 
working conditions (Souza-Poza & Souza-
Poza, 2000; McQuire, O’Donnell & Cross, 
2005). Convenience extrinsic rewards encom-
pass personal issues like living close to work, 
good working hours and an absence of  
job overload, role ambiguity and conflict 
(Greenberg, 1980; Price & Mueller, 1986; 
Kalleberg, 1977). Intrinsic rewards, on the 
other hand, appear to be derived from more 
informal interactive management processes 
that occur with respect to the design and 
implementation of strategy. These rewards 
include participation in decision making, 
ownership in the planning process, autonomy 
and open communication (Herzberg, Mausner 
& Snyderman, 1959; Greenberg, 1980; 
Marginson, 2002).  
Interactive management controls and 
motivation 
The relationship between motivation  and the 
degree of formal ‘static’ management control 
systems is particularly relevant in a research 
organisation because there cannot be an over 
reliance on formal controls (Saxberg & 
Slocum, 1968; Bisbe & Otley, 2004). The 
mediation of formal control systems is 
explained by different interactive styles 
(management) or approaches to ‘soften’ them 
in a relational context. Simons (1994) defines 
interactive controls as systems used by 
management to interface with subordinates 




regarding the formulation and implementation 
of formal controls. In this regard, it has been 
hypothesised that these interactive control 
systems positively influence motivation  
(Simons, 1994) because they incubate intrinsic 
rewards like ownership, autonomy and 
flexibility. Interactive management controls 
therefore promote a more favourable 
input/output ratio in the Souza-Poza and 
Souza-Poza (2000) motivation model because 
they increase the rewards relative to the same 
set of employee inputs.  
3 
Data and method 
A case study method was chosen in order to 
describe the design and implementation of the 
PMF of a state controlled organisation, as well 
as to determine if the organisation had 
achieved its objectives. This method was 
employed, not only because of the qualitative 
nature of the data, but also due to the 
exploratory nature of the study and the fact 
that it allowed us to collect data from multiple 
sources (Leedy, 1993; Yin, 1994; Leedy & 
Omrod, 2001). In this regard, we obtained data 
from interviews, company documents, press 
releases and websites. The data from the case 
study setting were primarily collected from  
a number of semi-structured interviews, 
illustrated in Table 1. Other data, consisting of 
company documents, were made available to 
the researchers in electronic or hard-copy 
format or by providing appropriate websites. 
With respect to the interviews, a senior CSIR 
Group manager for Research and Development 
was interviewed twice before he referred the 
researchers to suitable managers at business 
unit level.  Because of the wide range of 
responses, as well sources of data, a content 
analysis was used to assemble the data in 
themes and patterns (Breakwell, Hammond & 
Fife-Schaw, 2000). In order to ensure that the 
data had been reliably recorded, our written 
account of the case study was verified by the 




Data Source Method Time (hours) 
Head office executive 
Unit director (MSM) 








A survey of 39 researchers was conducted in 
order to determine if the PMF had motivated 
them, as well as facilitated the achievement of 
organisational objectives. The survey was also 
conducted to establish the presence, and extent 
of interactive controls, and to promote the 
reliability of the case study interviews. The 
choice of questions was largely based on the 
Kerssens-Van Drongelen (1999) study, as well 
as additional questions developed as a result of 
the case study interviews. Although the 
purposive sample size was limited, its reliability 
was improved because all the respondents were 
senior employees (researchers) who had an 
intimate knowledge of the division’s PMF 
(Lenth, 2001). The survey involved the use of 
a five-point Likert Scale to answer a series of 
questions. The questionnaire contained two 
primary sets of questions. The first set of 
questions tested the respondents’ level of 
motivation and their perception of whether the 
PMF had promoted the achievement of 
objectives. The second set of questions 
investigated the researchers’ perception of the 
existence of interactive management controls 
with respect to the design and implementation 
of the PMF. Basic descriptive statistics and 
qualitative analysis were employed to analyse 
the responses.  
4 
CSIR materials science and 
manufacturing division (MSM)   
4.1 Introduction 
The Council for Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) in South Africa operates 
under the Scientific Research Council Act 46 
of 1988. The CSIR and is mandated to foster 






industrial and scientific development in the 
national interest through multidisciplinary 
research and technological innovation, by itself 
or in collaboration with a range of local and 
international partners. The CSIR undertakes 
approximately 10 per cent of all research and 
development on the continent of Africa and 
recorded a total revenue of R 1.2 billion in 
2007/8, with approximately 40 per cent being 
received by way of a parliamentary grant from 
the South African government through its 
Department of Science and Technology (DST).  
The Materials Science and Manufacturing 
Division (MSM) is an operating business unit 
of the CSIR.  The strategic intent of Division 
MSM of the CSIR is to improve industry 
competitiveness, national human resource 
development and the quality of life for all 
South Africans through conducting research 
and innovation in the fields of materials and 
manufacturing. The unit conducts a range of 
applied research, experimental development 
and technology transfer activities in six main 
competency areas. These areas include light 
metals, polymers and bioceramics, fibres and 
textiles, manufacturing science and techno-
logy, energy and sensors. The unit employs 
260 personnel, of whom 205 are scientists or 
technologists.  
4.2 The performance measurement 
framework 
The format of the CSIR’s operational plans 
and PMF is standardised across all of its 
business divisions. The Division MSM of 
CSIR operational plan and PMF for 2007/8, 
illustrated in Table 2, was based on four 
primary strategies that each prompted a 
number of key actions. These key actions, in 
turn, influenced the selection of performance 
measures for the division that are then further 
customised for individual researchers. 
 
Table 2 
Actual versus planned performance for 2007/8  
Strategic focus 
area Actions Key performance measure 
Target 












Increase and improve 
R&D alliances 
 
Optimise mix of R&D 
 
 






No. collaborative projects exceeding R1m 
 
 
Ratio of research : development : tech transfer 
Optimally manage parliamentary grant 
 
Investment in equipment 







































No. studentships supported 
PhDs 
Masters 
No. post doctorates 
No. of permanent staff studying for master's & 
PhD degrees  
 
% Black researchers 
































Improve R & D 
outcomes 
Contract R&D aligned to national strategies 
Value of multi-year public contracts 
Value of multi-year term  private  contracts 
 
Stakeholder satisfaction index 
Patents 
New technology packages for transfer  
Revenue from  intellectual property 

































Significant audit findings 
Quality management systems   
Injury frequency rate (disabling) 
Black economic empowerment rating  







< 0.8 per 200 000 
hrs 










Plans in place 
 




Although the Division MSM of CSIR has 
labelled its PMF as a balanced scorecard 
(BSC), it does not reflect the same dimensions 
or causal sequences as the Kaplan and Norton 
model. In effect, it is a multi-dimensional PMF 
that displays causal linkages between the four 
principal dimensions that are based on four key 
strategies. The four key strategies are opera-
tionalised by ten principal actions that translate 
into 30 performance measures (abridged 
version of PMF). Furthermore, a causal link 
exists between Strategies 2 and 4, namely, that 
the investment in human capital translates into 
operational excellence and financial sustain-
ability. Operational excellence and financial 
sustainability, in turn, influence the quantity 
and quality of outputs (Strategy 1) which 
translates into research outcomes (Strategy 3) 
like the commercialisation of technology 
developments.  
The management of Division MSM of 
CSIR’s performance measurement framework 
operates on a quarterly basis. Each perfor-
mance report compares actual progress against 
phased targets and a brief summary of 
achievements and challenges are discussed. In 
addition, a series of actions are listed with 
respect to overcoming any challenges in the 
quarterly results, as well as meeting the 
attainment of future phased targets. A revised 
forecast for the year is also prepared. At the 
end of each financial year, actual performance 
is compared to the annual targets for each 
performance measure (PM) for the division, as 
well as for each researcher. The PMF, in this 
regard, uses a five point rating scale to 
evaluate individual performance, ranging from 
‘outstanding’ (rating of 1) to ‘does not meet 
expectations’ (rating of 5).  
4.3 Meeting stakeholder expectations 
The Division MSM of CSIR should meet the 
expectations of a wide range of stakeholders. 
Further analysis of company documents, 
illustrated in Table 3, identifies external 
stakeholders like the state, society, alliance 
partners, customers and employees. In this 
regard, the company records reflect steadily 
increasing outputs and stakeholder outcomes 
from 2005 to 2008.  Publications, for example, 
increased by 275 per cent, the unit has also 
significantly increased its investments in new 
equipment and raised its number of 
international patents, thus responding to the 
needs of stakeholders like the state, industry, 
alliance partners and its customers. In addition, 
the satisfaction of alliance partners and 
customers was confirmed by a customer 
satisfaction rating (including alliance partners) 
of 86.5 per cent that manifested in a large 
increase in external contract income in the 
2007/8 actual results.  Company documents 
also reflect that Division MSM of CSIR has 
responded to the expectations of stakeholders 
like the employees, the state and society by 
achieving excellent long term results with 
respect to the building and transforming of 
human capital since 2005/6.  
 
Table 3 
Stakeholder performance  
Performance Measures Stakeholder 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 
Peer reviewed publications State,  society, alliance partners, customers 14 31 52.5 
PCT and international patents State, society, alliance partners, customers 1 2 6 
Investment in equipment State, society, alliance partners, customers R 4.3m R 18.6m R 30.5m 
Number of PhDs / doctorates State, employees, society 32 42 40 
Number of Masters State, employees, society 37 46 42 
% researchers who are black State, employees, society 58  60.0 63.5 
% researchers who are female State, employees, society 23  25.0 28.0 
Royalty & license income State, society R0.5m R1.1m R 0.2m 
External income: contracts State, customer-alliances R59.8m R57.1m R 78.9m 
Net margin State, employees R 0.3m R 2.4m R 4.1m 
 






This progress is confirmed in the DST 2006/7 
annual report in which it commends the CSIR 
(in aggregate) for its efforts. In order to ensure 
a better long term understanding of stakeholder 
expectations, a survey is conducted at CSIR 
level every 3-4 years. The survey is conducted 
by an independent panel that includes 
government departments, parastatals like 
ESKOM and Transnet, major industry players 
and the higher education sector. The survey 
conducted in 2008 indicated generally high 
levels of satisfaction but also highlighted the 
need for better communication of the CSIR 
mandate, improved promotion of the multi-
disciplinary nature of the organisation, further 
transformation at management level and 
concerns about intellectual property (IP) issues 
when partnering with the CSIR.  
5 
Results and discussion 
The results first test if the PMF motivated  
the researchers, as well as facilitated the 
achievement of organisational objectives The 
results then establish the presence and extent 
of interactive controls (actions) before 
discussing how they augmented the PMF in 
order to influence motivation.  
5.1  Did the PMF motivate researchers, 
as well as facilitate the achievement 
of strategic objectives?  
The level of motivation of the researchers, as 
well as their perception of the role of the PMF 
with respect to facilitating the achievement of 
objectives, is illustrated in Table 4. A median 
score of 1 indicates a very low motivation and 
a score of 5 very high motivation. Case study 
interviews were used to support the findings of 
the survey. The results indicate the three levels 
of researchers were highly motivated by the 
PMF. Interestingly, the more senior the level 
of researcher, the higher was the level of 
motivation. In this regard, a Kruskal Wallis 
test indicated that Level 1 (more senior) 
researchers were significantly more motivated 
than Level 3 (less senior) researchers (p<0.05). 
Other measures used to gauge PMF related 
motivation indicated that the individual 
performance measures were achievable and 
appropriate and that there were consequences 
linked to non-achievement. Another important 
motivational factor was that bonuses were 
directly linked to performance. The case study 
data revealed that:  
The percentage of the total bonus pool 
allocated to Division MSM of CSIR is 
determined by the unit’s annual perfor-
mance that is compared to the other 
business units of the CSIR. On an individual 
level, the annual bonus allocation for top 
achievers can amount to twice the staff 
member’s monthly salary or even more.  
Staff salaries are also largely determined by 
their position on CSIR career ladders, and 
there is good alignment between the criteria 
used to place staff at the correct level on 
such ladders and important performance 
measures. These include the level of staff 
qualification as well as performance with 
respect to research outputs, human capital 
development efforts, the impact they have 
made in their field and the value of contract 
R&D secured. 
The results show that a majority of the 
performance measures (PM) were objective 
thus ensuring the impartiality of the measures 
in a research sector context (Kerssens-van 
Drongelen et al., 2000). The results also 
indicated there was not a perception of 
measurement overload (number of perfor-
mance measures) which is often evident in 
public sector organisations because of the wide 
range of stakeholders (Brignall, 2002; 
Wisniewski & Steward, 2004; McAdam, 
Hazlett & Casey, 2005; Chang, 2007).  Finally, 
the results indicated the researchers were 
ambivalent about the fairness of the 
performance measures across other divisions 
and competence areas, as well as the 
controllability of their results. This is a 
universal problem in the research sector, 
however, because of the long time lags 
between activities and outputs, as well as the 
obscure nature of certain research outcomes 
(Kerssens-van Drongelen et al., 2000). 
 
 





The motivation of researchers and achievement of objectives 
 Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Motivation of researchers 
The PMF motivated you re strategic objectives** 4 3 4 
Are your individual PM appropriate? 4 4 5 
Are there consequences for non achievement of PM? 4 3 4 
Are PM s achievable? 4 4 5 
Is your bonus linked to the PMF? 4 4 5 
Are the PMs objective? (1=Subjective, 5=Objective) 4 3 4 
Does the PMF have an appropriate number of PMs 4 3 4 
Are PMs fair across the competence areas? 3 3 4 
Are actions needed to achieve PM targets controllable? 3 3 4 
Achievement of objectives 
The unit achieved its strategic objectives 4 4 4 
The PMF is aligned with strategic objectives 4 3 4 
PMF helped achieve strategic objectives  4 3 4 
** Significant at 5% level (Kruskal-Wallis Test) 
 
The role of the PMF and the achievement of 
objectives 
The results of the survey, illustrated in Table 4 
above, indicated the PMF had played a 
positive role with respect to the achievement  
of organisation objectives because it was 
positively aligned with these objectives. The 
case study data also supported the conclusion 
that the Division MSM of CSIR had achieved 
a majority of its organisational objectives for 
2007/8 with respect to actual performance 
versus target for 30 performance measures 
based on the four principal strategies (see 
Table 2). In this regard, the case study data 
indicated that actual performance exceeded or 
met the target for seven of the eight 
performance measures with regard to the first 
strategy, namely, strengthening the science and 
technology base. Targets exceeded included 
publications, invention disclosures, collabora-
tions, investment in new equipment, com-
pliance with the parliamentary grant and the 
implementation of a research advisory panel. 
The results of the second strategic focus area, 
namely, building and transforming human 
capital, indicate the division achieved seven 
out of the eight measures but that the target to 
attract doctoral staff was not achieved. With 
regard to the third strategic focus area, the 
PMF indicates achievement of five of the eight 
performance measures but shows that revenue 
from intellectual property and the number of 
new licensing agreements were not achieved.  
Finally, all of the targets in the fourth strategic 
focus area were achieved, with particularly 
good results recorded for contract R&D 
income and net margin. In conclusion, 
therefore, it would appear that the PMF 
motivated the researchers, as well as played a 
positive role with respect to the achievement of 
organisational objectives in 2007/8. The results 
show that formal controls can motivate, 
however, the question remains whether they 
were augmented by interactive controls.  
5.2  What interactive management 
controls augmented the PMF? 
A range of variables, illustrated in Table 5, 
were used to test for the presence and extent of 
interactive controls that were deployed in the 
design and implementation of the PMF.  
A median score of 1 indicates a low level of 
interactive control. Conversely, a score of  
5 indicates a high level of interactive control.  
Case study interviews were used in support of 
the observations of the survey. 
 







Evidence of interactive controls 
 
The survey indicated management (leadership) 
were highly committed to the PMF. Case study 
interviews confirmed this and one interviewee 
said the enthusiasm of senior management was 
transmitted down to the three levels of 
researchers. This enthusiasm resulted in high 
levels of leadership involvement in the 
management of the PMF that triggered both 
top-down, as well as bottom-up communica-
tion. As further evidence of interactive 
controls, the survey results confirmed that the 
PMF had been clearly communicated to the 
respondents and, furthermore, that the PMF 
had helped communicate strategy to them. In 
this regard, the case study interviews also 
confirmed that the PMF targets, as well as  
the quarterly results, had been clearly 
communicated to the researchers both verbally 
and as result of receiving the necessary 
documentation.  
The survey results also indicated high levels 
of ownership in the determination of individual 
performance measures and that these had been 
customised to take into account the particular 
situation of the researcher. 
According to one interviewee,  
researchers have considerable leeway in a 
very participative environment and any 
researcher can initiate new research pro-
posals. Furthermore, the performance 
measurement targets result from an inter-
active discussion rather than being imposed 
in a top down manner.  
In this regard, the Strategic Research Manager 
stressed that, ‘the development of individual 
performance targets was a bottom up process 
in which all researchers participated’. 
The results also indicated that the 
performance measures and their targets were 
very clear to the respondents confirming the 
positive interactive processes of ownership and 
open communication. The interactive process, 
moreover, was consolidated with timely 
feedback. In this regard, the case study inter-
views revealed that this interactive process 
involved detailed feedback and support from 
each respondent’s immediate superior. This 
support involved assistance to correct any 
problems confronting the individual researcher 
concerned.  
The survey results showed that the PMF had 
been instrumental in fostering learning. The 
case study data suggested that learning was 
promoted because of the detailed interaction, 
challenges and discussions that occurred 
throughout the year. In this regard, the 
respondents indicated that senior personnel 
often provided considerable advice and 
guidance and that this interactive process had 
facilitated decisions in the division. The case 
study interviews confirmed that the PMF 
facilitated decision making because it 
identified specific challenges that required 
groups of researchers to interact before coming 
to a decision. Finally, the respondents were 
ambivalent about whether the PMF had 





Is the leadership committed to the PMF?  5 4 5 
Has the PMF been clearly communicated to you?  4 4 5 
Did the PMF help communicate unit strategy to you 4 3 4 
Do you have ownership in setting PM targets?  5 4 5 
Have PM ‘s been customised for your level? 4 3 4 
Have  PM’ s been made clear to you?  5 4 5 
Are you given timely feedback re PMF results?     4 3 5 
The PMF helps foster learning  4 3 4 
The PMF has facilitated decision making 4 3 4 
The PMF limits/corrects poor behaviour 3 3 4 
The PMS influences re-organisation of your unit 3 2.5 4 
Average 4.333 3.444 4.555 




corrected poor behaviour or influenced any re-
organisation in the unit. 
Although the issue of project selection was 
not questioned in the survey, the results of the 
case study interviews highlight the importance 
of this interactive process in a research 
organisation (Jamsen et al., 2002; Godener & 
Soderquist, 2004). 
In this regard, the Strategic Research 
Manager said that,  
MSM evaluates every new project with 
respect to a wide range of criteria. These 
include the type of research being proposed, 
the risk, the fit with the overall R&D 
portfolio and an analysis of the project 
financial and social return. This process is 
facilitated by a CSIR wide proposal 
management system. Furthermore, an 
eighteen person team of senior MSM 
researchers, namely, the Science and 
Technology Forum (SET), performs a peer 
review of all project proposals and progress 
reports which help inform the project 
selection process. 
In conclusion, there appears to be considerable 
evidence of interactive controls with respect to 
the design and implementation of the PMF. 
The question remains, however, as to how 
these interactive controls augmented the PMF 
to motivate the researchers.  
5.3  How did interactive controls 
augment the PMF to motivate 
researchers? 
The results illustrate that the formal PMF, 
augmented by interactive controls, not only 
motivated the researchers, but also facilitated 
the achievement of organisational objectives. 
The important motivating role of the formal 
PMF, therefore, should not be ignored. In this 
regard, the PMF was linked to important 
extrinsic rewards like remuneration and fringe 
benefits that create a foundation to motivate 
employees.  Two seminal studies contend that 
these extrinsic rewards, called hygiene factors, 
do not necessarily motivate individuals, rather 
their absence has a demotivating effect 
(Maslow, 1943; Herzberg et al., 1959).  
The case study results certainly confirmed  
that the researchers performance was linked  
to remuneration and that they were not 
dissatisfied in this respect. Furthermore, the 
case study illustrated that standardised salary 
scales were openly applied across all the 
divisions of the CSIR, thus ensuring that all 
levels of researchers knew their remuneration 
was on a par with their colleagues. Robbins 
(1993) proposes that this perception of equity 
is also an important motivating factor. The 
formal PMF, therefore, provided a baseline set 
of rewards that were matched with each 
researchers inputs that included their 
qualifications, experience and training. The 
importance of these rewards is sometimes 
understated in professional employee surveys 
(McQuire, O’Donnell & Cross, 2005).  Formal 
controls, therefore, must incorporate a baseline 
set of extrinsic rewards upon which motivation 
is incubated.  
A set of interactive controls augmented the 
design and implementation of the PMF to 
generate a secondary set of intrinsic rewards. 
Herzberg et al. (1959) contend that employees 
are motivated by satisfying experiences that 
are based on intrinsic rewards. The motiva-
tional role of intrinsic rewards like autonomy, 
ownership and open communication is 
especially important in the high technology 
and professional sectors (Abernathy & 
Brownell, 1997; Bisbe & Otley, 2004; 
Ramnall, 2004). These intrinsic rewards, 
therefore, augment formal extrinsic rewards 
without changing the individual’s level of 
inputs like qualifications and experience. From 
an input-output theory perspective, the 
incremental rewards generated by the 
interactive controls would be a motivating 
factor because the level of inputs remain 
unchanged (Souza-Poza & Souza-Poza, 2000; 
Andriopoulos, 2001; Ramlall, 2004). Further-
more, the presence of interactive controls 
augments formal controls to increase motiva-
tion because they improve the perception of 
the fairness of formal controls (Amabile et al., 
1996). Finally, interactive controls promote 
motivation because they influence more 
favourable organisation structures to work in.  
Transaction cost theory explains this in terms 
of the interactive behaviour building trust that, 
in turn, reduces the need for monitoring and 
control thus promoting self regulation, 
flexibility and autonomy (Ouchi, 1980; Das & 






Teng, 1998; Sartorius & Kirsten, 2007). These 
characteristics allow for flatter organisation 
structures that work because trust allows 
higher levels of flexibility and a reduced 
reliance on formal rules (Andriopoulos, 2001). 
Interactive controls, therefore, promote moti-
vation because they act as a lubricant to reduce 
organisational friction, as well as allow more 
freedom and flexibility in the work place 
(Porter & Lawler, 1965; Markus, Manville & 
Agres, 2000). In conclusion, interactive 
controls motivate personnel because they 




The paper illustrates the complex nature of 
controls in the research sector. A theoretical 
framework hypothesised that motivation is a 
function of total rewards less inputs. The 
literature also suggested that the motivation of 
professionals was likely to be compromised if 
there was an over emphasis of formal controls.  
In this regard, tasks in a research and 
development organisation are associated with a 
high degree of variety, uncertainty and low 
levels of analysability. As work related 
activities become less routine (analysable) and 
incorporate higher degrees of variety, controls 
should move away from formal to informal 
personnel controls. A case study, incorporating 
a survey, was then developed in order to obtain 
the data to test the research questions.  
The results of the first research question 
indicated that the PMF had motivated its 
researchers, as well as facilitated its organi-
sational objectives for 2007/8. This occurred 
because the individual performance measures 
were clear, achievable and linked to 
remuneration, as well as aligned with strategic 
objectives. The important motivating role of 
ensuring the right balance of extrinsic rewards, 
like remuneration and fringe benefits, cannot 
be over-emphasised in the professional sector. 
Ironically, what professionals say and think 
about the importance of extrinsic rewards, is 
often contradictory. 
The results of the second research question 
uncovered the presence of high levels of 
interactive controls involved in the design and 
implementation of the PMF. This interactive 
behaviour was precipitated by upper manage-
ment support and was underpinned by the fact 
that there were high levels of communication 
and ownership in the formal PMF system. This 
interactive behaviour was clearly more 
informal and spontaneous and it appeared to 
facilitate learning, as well as better decisions 
like project selection.  The usefulness of the 
results is that they clearly identify a set of 
interactive controls in the PMF of a complex 
research environment.  
The third research question then discussed 
how interactive controls positively influence 
motivation because they increase the net level 
of rewards in the work environment. Inter-
active controls, moreover, motivate employees 
because they improve the perception of formal 
controls, as well as influencing the efficiency 
of working structures within the organisation. 
The usefulness of these results is that they 
demonstrate how interactive controls have both 
psychological and economic benefits, not only 
from an employee perspective, but the 
organisation as well. The positive role of 
interactive controls presents the possibility that 
professionals can be motivated in the most 
problematic environments if management 
creates the conditions for these controls. 
Finally, the conclusions reached in this paper 
are based on the exploratory nature of the 
study, thus not lending themselves to wide 
generalisations. The application of this theory, 
therefore, needs to be explored in a wider 
context.  
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